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Abstract—Interference usually is an adverse phenomenon in wireless
networks. However, the interference can potentially be used to boost
the secrecy rate in wireless interference channels. This work studies
the secrecy rate in a two-user interference network where unintended
user may overhear one of the users, namely user 1. User 1 tunes its
transmission power in order to maximize its secrecy rate as well as to
maintain the quality of service at the other user’s destination, user 2,
while both user’s power limits are considered. It is demonstrated that
achieving a positive secrecy rate for user 1 only depends on the channel
conditions and user 2’s transmission power. Consequently, depending on
the channel conditions, the exact threshold for user 2’s transmission power
which leads to a positive secrecy rate for user 1 is derived.
Keywords—Physical-layer security, wireless interference channel, power
control, secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sending information through wireless channels is a common
way to communicate in networks. However, transmitting information
over the same frequency band results in interference among users.
Furthermore, more and more frequency bands are allocated to wireless
communication technology which makes the spectrum scarce. As
a solution, the spectrum can be shared which in turn results in
interference. For instance, standards such as WiFi, Zigbee and
Bluetooth that transmit information over the same frequency band,
known as the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band, may
interfere with each other [1]. In addition, wireless transmission exposes
data to wiretappers. Here, “wiretapper”, or “eavesdropper” indicate the
unintended users. By employing physical layer security techniques, a
specific secure rate using a proper coding schemes [2] can be defined
for a user. As a result, the unintended agents can be prevented from
overhearing the information [3].
The physical layer security in the interference channel to provide
perfect secure transmission has recently attracted some attention. The
authors of [4] consider a two-user interference channel with an external
eavesdropper. It is shown that the structured transmission based on
information theory security leads to a higher secrecy rate compared to
randomly generated Gaussian codebooks. In [5], noise injection along
with data and joint codebook design is investigated in order to enhance
the secrecy capacity region in a two-user interference channel, while
an external wiretapper is present. In [6], the secrecy capacity region
for Gaussian and discrete memoryless channels is investigated in a
two-user network with an external eavesdropper. One user, receives
constructive interference from the other user to improve its security.
A. Contributions and main results
We study achieving a positive secrecy rate in a two-user wireless
interference network in the presence of an unintended user. Users
transmit in a manner to maximize the secrecy rate of the first user,
user 1, and sustain the quality of service (QoS) at the destination of
the second user, user 2. Here, the eavesdropper only tries to wiretap
user 1.
As shall be shown later, the motivations for user 2 to cooperate
can be justified as: 1) sometimes user 1 cannot achieve a positive
secrecy rate and stops its transmission. As a result, user 2 can enjoy an
interference-free transmission, 2) user 2 tunes its transmission power
so that the QoS at user 2’s destination is held equal or above the
threshold. We demonstrate that user 2’s transmission power as well
as the channel conditions are the only parameters which define the
feasibility of a positive secrecy rate for user 1. Based on the channel
conditions, the amount of transmission power for the second user is
specified to preserve a positive secrecy rate for user 1.
B. Related Work
The secrecy capacity in a two-user interference network is
investigated in [7]–[11]. The authors of [12] study the secrecy capacity
when a number of nodes are employed to suppress eavesdropping by
intentional interference. Beamforming weights of antennas are jointly
designed for a two-user interference network in [13] in order to enhance
the secrecy rate. Further, the concept of interference exploitation to
improve the secrecy is also investigated in cognitive radio networks.
In [14], the secrecy rate is optimized for a multiple-antenna secondary
user in the presence of a wiretapper while sustaining the QoS at the
primary receiver. A scenario where the primary user tries to increase
its secrecy rate by getting help from the secondary user is considered
in [15]. The achievable rate region for both primary and secondary
users is derived when secondary user causes interference to both
primary and eavesdropper. A network comprised of single-antenna
nodes is considered in [16] where a transceiver pair need to keep
the transmission secret from an eavesdropper. Game theory is used
to analyze the interaction between this pair and other nodes which
act as cooperative jammers. Nodes which cooperate as jammers are
permitted to use a part of the primary user’s spectrum in exchange of
the jamming service that they have provided.
The underlaying problem formulation in the mentioned works
is different from the one in our work. Also, none of these papers
provide an exact analytical insight in the required feasibility conditions
in order to achieve a positive secrecy rate in a wiretap interference
channel network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The network structure
and signal model are introduced in Section II. In Section III, the
optimization problem is defined and the feasibility of a positive secrecy
rate is investigated. Numerical results are presented in Section IV,
and Section V concludes our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Signal Model
A wireless interference model comprised of two users denoted by
U1 and U2, two destinations denoted by D1 and D2, and one user as
a potential eavesdropper denoted by E is considered. All nodes are
considered to be equipped with one antenna. The same frequency band
is used by U1 and U2 to send data to their corresponding destinations,
D1 and D2, respectively. Using the same frequency band by the users
leads to cross-interference. The network model is depicted in Fig. 1.
The wiretapper, E, overhears the users. In our model, E can only
decode the signal transmitted by U1, and thus is not able to decode
U2’s signal. Hence, x2 is the signal which generates interference on
both D1 and E.
In the considered network, U1 requires maintaining a positive
secrecy rate, so the fair procedure would be that U1 affords all the
computational and transmission cost for calculating and distributing
the optimal transmission powers. The intended destinations as well
as the eavesdropper send pilots to the transmitters which enables
them to estimate the required CSIs. Then, U2 forwards the estimated
CSIs to U1. U1 uses the estimated CSIs received from U2 as well
as the CSIs estimated by itself to derive the optimal values for the
users’ transmission powers. Consequently, U2 receives the value of
its optimal transmission power from U1. When the eavesdropper is
completely passive, it is difficult to get its CSI. However, in our
scenario, as the eavesdropper is an unintended user which is part of
the network of U1, its channel can be estimated by receiving pilots
during the estimation period.
The received signals by D1 and D2 are as follows
yD1 =
√
P1hU1,D1x1 +
√
P2hU2,D1x2 + nD1 , (1)
yD2 =
√
P2hU2,D2x2 +
√
P1hU1,D2x1 + nD2 , (2)
where P1 and P2 are the power of the transmitted signals by U1 and
U2, and hUi,Dj is the channel gain from each user to the corresponding
destination for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2.
√
Pixi and nDi are the transmit
signal from the i-th user, and the additive white Gaussian noise at the
i-th destination for i = 1, 2, respectively. The random variables xi
and nDi are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with xi ∼
CN (0, 1) and nDi ∼ CN (0, σ2n), respectively. The overheard signal
by E is given by
yE =
√
P1hU1,Ex1 +
√
P2hU2,Ex2 + nE , (3)
where hUi,E is the channel coefficient from the i-th user to the
eavesdropper for i = 1, 2, and nE is the additive white Gaussian
noise at the eavesdropper with the same distribution as nDi . The
additive white Gaussian noise at different receivers are assumed to be
mutually independent.
B. Users’ transmission rates
The transmission rate for each user to the corresponding destination
is derived using (1) and (2) as
RU1−D1 = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
, (4)
RU2−D2 = log2
(
1 +
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
)
. (5)
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Fig. 1: Two-user wireless interference network.
C. Eavesdropper’s reception rate
Since the eavesdropper is part of the U1’s network, its receiver is
similar to the one for the other users of the network. As a result, similar
to the works [7], [12], [17], [18], it is assumed that the eavesdropper
is not capable of decoding and thus canceling the U2’s signal; hence,
the instantaneous reception rate from U1 toward E is obtained as
RU1−E = log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
)
. (6)
The optimization problem to maximize U1’s secrecy rate is defined
in the next section. Furthermore, the conditions in order to achieve a
positive secrecy rate for U1 are also studied there.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, an optimization problem is defined in order to
maximize U1’s secrecy rate subject to the peak power limits of the
users as well as the quality of service (QoS) at D2. Furthermore,
according to the channel CSIs, we derive the required condition on
U2’s transmission power in order to guarantee a positive secrecy rate
for U1.
As a metric to measure the number of bits which can be transmitted
securely by U1, we obtain the secrecy rate as [3],
RS = max
x
[RU1−D1 −RU1−E ]+ (7)
where [·]+ ∆= max (·, 0) and x is the message bearing signal. It is
shown in [6], [8], [19] that using an input with Gaussian distribution
maximizes the mutual information between a transmitter and the
corresponding receiver in a one-sided interference channel. For the
sake of simplicity, we drop the operator [·]+ in rest of the paper.
Employing the secrecy rate in (7) and considering the peak power
limits of the users and the QoS at D2, optimal P1 and P2 can be
obtained by solving the following optimization problem
max
P1,P2
RS
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 ,
P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
RU2−D2 ≥ β, (8)
where β is the minimum data rate for U2. Inserting (4), (5) and (6)
in (8), and considering the fact that log is a monotonic increasing
function of its argument, we obtain
max
P1,P2
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 ,
P2 ≤ Pmax2 ,
P2|hU2,D2 |2
P1|hU1,D2 |2 + σ2n
≥ γ. (9)
where γ is 2β − 1.
To derive the necessary condition on U2’s transmission power in
order to achieve a positive secrecy rate for U1, we try to optimize P1
for a given P2 in (9). For this case, (9) is reduced to
max
P1
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2+σ2n
1 +
P1|hU1,E|2
P2|hU2,E|2+σ2n
s. t. P1 ≤ Pmax1 ,
P1 ≤ P2|hU2,D2 |
2 − γσ2n
γ|hU1,D2 |2
. (10)
In Theorem 1, the bounds on P2 to preserve a positive secrecy rate
for U1 are obtained.
Theorem 1: In order to achieve a positive secrecy rate for user 1,
i.e., having a grater or equal to one objective in (10), P2 should satisfy
the following bounds:
P2 >
A
B
if A > 0, B > 0, (11a)
P2 > 0 if A < 0, B > 0, (11b)
P2 <
A
B
if A < 0, B < 0, (11c)
where A = σ2n
(|hU1,E |2 − |hU1,D1 |2) and B =
|hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2 . Note that beside each
condition above, it is assumed that the QoS at the destination of
U2 is feasible, i.e., P2 ≥ γσ
2
n
|hU2,D2 |2
. Further, for A > 0, B < 0,
irrespective of the value of P2, no positive secrecy rate can be
obtained for U1.
Proof: For the objective function in (10) to be greater or equal
to one, the following condition must hold
log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,D1 |2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
)
> 0
⇒ P1|hU1,D1 |
2
P2|hU2,D1 |2 + σ2n
>
P1|hU1,E |2
P2|hU2,E |2 + σ2n
⇒
P2 >
σ2n
(|hU1,E|2−|hU1,D1 |2)
B
B > 0
P2 <
σ2n
(|hU1,E|2−|hU1,D1 |2)
B
B < 0
(12)
where B = |hU1,D1 |2|hU2,E |2 − |hU2,D1 |2|hU1,E |2.
One explicit result of Theorem 1 is given in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1: In a wiretap interference channel as mentioned in
Theorem 1, the possibility of achieving a positive secrecy rate for
user 1 is independent from user 1’s transmitting power, P1, and only
depends on the channel conditions as well as the value of P2.
In Theorem 1, A shows the difference between U1’s data and wiretap
channel gains. To clarify, B can be rewritten as B = |hU1,D1 |
2
|hU1,E|2
−
|hU2,D1 |2
|hU2,E|2
= B1 − B2. The new form of B compares U1’s self
channel to its wiretap channel gain ratio, B1, with respect to U2’s
cross channel toward U1 to U2’s cross channel toward eavesdropper
gain ratio, B2. We name the former ratio as the “security ratio”, and
the latter as the “security interference ratio”. For a constant security
interference ratio, a higher secrecy ratio enhances the secrecy rate.
On the other hand, given a constant security ratio, a higher security
interference ratio yields a lower secrecy rate. Results of Theorem 1
can be summarized as follows
1) When U1’s wiretap channel gain is higher than its own
channel gain, but the security ratio is higher than the security
interference ratio, U2 can grant a positive secrecy rate to U1
by a transmission power higher than A
B
. In other words, the
interference from U2 on E can compensate for U1’s weak
data channel gain and grant a positive secrecy rate to U1.
2) If U1’s wiretap channel gain is higher than its data channel
gain, but the security ratio is lower than the security
interference ratio, any transmitting power by U2 is not
capable of providing U1 with a positive secrecy rate. This
implies that the interference from U2 on E cannot contribute
to U1’s secrecy rate. Consequently, U1 is better not to
transmit.
3) When U1’s data channel gain is higher than its wiretap
channel gain, and the security ratio is higher than the security
interference ratio, U1 can obtain a positive secrecy rate with
any transmission power from U2. In other words, since U1
has already a positive secrecy rate, and the security ratio is
higher than the security interference ratio, any transmission
power from U2 results in a positive secrecy rate.
4) If U1’s data channel gain is higher than its wiretap channel
gain but the security ratio is lower than the security
interference ratio, U2 can provide U1 with a positive secrecy
rate by a transmitting power less than A
B
.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present different scenarios for numerical
evaluations. As a benchmark, we consider a single-user scenario
where only one user is present in an interference-free environment [3].
In all simulation scenarios, we assume that the noise power is equal
to one, i.e., σ2n = 1. All the the channel coefficients are modeled
as i.i.d. complex normal random variables with real and imaginary
parts following a distribution as N (0, 1). The channel coefficients are
normalized to have a unit variance as CN (0, 1).
In Fig. 2, different cases of Theorem 1 are verified with respect to
the maximum available power of the first user, Pmax1 , using separate
random channel generations. Examples for the Case 11a and Case 11c
of Theorem (1) are plotted for two different values of the maximum
available power to the second user, Pmax2 . As we can see in Fig. 2, a
slight deviation from the power thresholds of U2 obtained in Theorem 1
leads to a negative secrecy rate.
Different cases of Theorem 1 are plotted in Fig. 3 with respect to
the mximum available power for user 2, Pmax2 , in order to further
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Fig. 2: Examples of Theorem 1 when Pmax1 is variable.
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Fig. 3: Examples of Theorem 1 when Pmax2 is variable.
investigate the results of Theorem 1. For the curve related to the
Case 11a of Theorem (1), it is seen as Pmax2 passes the defined
power threshold, the value of the secrecy rate moves from a negative
one to a positive one. On the contrary, for the curve related to the
Case 11c of Theorem (1), when Pmax2 passes the defined power
threshold, the secrecy rate deteriorates and becomes negative. Finally,
we see that for the Case 11b of Theorem (1), the positive secrecy rate
can be maintained for all the transmit powers from U2.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
max
1
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
ec
re
cy
 s
at
e 
(b
/s/
Hz
)
 
 
Single−user, no interference channel
Interference channel, P
max
2
=20
Interference channel, P
max
2
=30
Interference channel, P
max
2
=10
γ
th=0.3
γ
th=0.2
γ
th=0.1
Fig. 4: Average secrecy rate versus Pmax1 .
The comparison of the secrecy rate in the single-user benchmark
and the interference channel scenarios is presented in Fig. 4 with
respect to the maximum available power of the first user. Note that
to solve (8) analytically, we follow the algorithms provided in [20].
Following points can be implied from Fig. 4:
1) According to the required SINR at D2, the secrecy rate of
the interference channel can be higher or lower than the one
of the single-user case. When the data channel is stronger
than the wiretap channel in the single-user case, the user
can transmit with the maximum available power. On the
other hand, U1 is not able to transmit with the maximum
available power in the interference channel since it has to
take care of the QoS at D2.
2) When the required SINR at D2, γth, falls below a specific
level, the performance of the interference channel becomes
better than the single-user case. Because the interference
from U1 decreases the QoS at D2, U1 cannot transmit with
the maximum available power. On the other hand, as the
QoS constraint limit, γth, decreases, U1 can transmit with
a higher power. In other words, U1 takes advantage of the
interference form U2 and transmits with a higher power. As
a result, with lower power consumption, the secrecy rate
in the interference channel is superior to the one of the
single-user case.
3) Increasing Pmax2 enhances the average secrecy rate much
less compared to increasing the Pmax1 . By increasing Pmax2 ,
U2 creates more interference not only on E, but also on
D1.
V. CONCLUSION
The role of interference on enhancing the secrecy rate in a two-user
wireless interference network was studied in this paper. The appropriate
range of transmission power for the interfering user, namely user 2,
in order to obtain a positive secrecy rate for the other user, namely
user 1, was determined according to the channel qualities. We showed
that below a specific required QoS at the destination of user 2, the
secrecy rate in the interference channel becomes higher than the one
in the single-user case.
Considering the case where a multiple-antenna eavesdropper can
perform joint decoding and get access to messages of both users is
the subject of the future work.
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